This article, for which the focus is an intellectual autobiography, examines the development of worldview of a young person who graduated from the Moscow University Faculty of Philosophy in 1970. I...

The citation index of Thomas Kuhn’s work may strike any imagination. “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” is undoubtedly a twentieth-century record-breaker in the field of philosophy of science in terms of such a scientometric parameter. But such fame has been bitter in many ways and placed a heavy burden on the author. For several decades he has been the target of the harshest and most severe criticism. Often the concept of “normal science” and the “scientific revolution” as a “Gestalt switch” (...) was declared ridiculous and absurd. The paper analyses three lines of criticism of Kuhn’s concept: the first came from practicing scientists, the second from specialists in the philosophy of science, and the third from the field of social epistemology. Reproaches about the political bias of Kuhn’s concept were taken to extremes, since his views were widely popular. In our opinion, Kuhn should be called a victim of spontaneous hypercriticism. This circumstance did not allow him to improve the original model of scientific revolutions. In this respect, replacing the concept of “paradigm” with the concept of “disciplinary matrix” was a step backwards, not forwards. However, it is impossible to deny that in the field of the historiography of science, he acted as a real reformer. With the courage of Don Quixote, he defended the rights of historical reconstruction, the preservation of the historical past of science, which should not be completely assimilated within the framework of the modern system of knowledge. His motto was – “penetrate the minds of other people who lived in the past.” He boldly argued that in the process of historical development, science changes not only ideas about the object of knowledge, but also the reference of its ideas and concepts. Such a formulation of the question has not yet been fully reflected in modern epistemological concepts. (shrink)

For the past decade and a half, Aristotelians have tried to counter the following criticism articulated by John Doris: if we look at personality and social psychology research, we must conclude that we generally neither have, nor have the capacity to develop, character traits of the kind envisioned by Aristotle and his followers. Some defenses of Aristotelian virtue ethics proceed by trying to insulate it from this challenge, while others have tried to dissipate the force of Doris's critique by showing (...) how virtue ethics and recent findings in personality psychology share surprisingly extensive common ground. For example, in their 2009 books, Daniel Russell and Nancy Snow both argue that the empirical research regarding character complements - not undermines - virtue ethics. Specifically, each argues that the situationally sensitive Cognitive-Affective Personality System developed by Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda can be integrated into a virtue ethical moral philosophy and theory of character. In this paper, I raise several objections to their attempts to use the CAPS model to rehabilitate Aristotelian virtue ethics and argue that, as a result, this model has not been shown to have the promise Snow and Russell allege it has. (shrink)

Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason remains one of the most opaque of Kant's published writings. Though this opacity belongs, partly, to the text itself, a key claim of this article is that this opacity stems also from the narrow lenses through which his readers view this text. Often read as part of Kant's moral philosophy or his universal history, the literature has thus far neglected a different vantage point on the Religion, one that does not refute the utility (...) of these lenses but complements them. This paper places the Religion alongside parts of Kant's corpus that it is less typically paired with, namely his natural history writings—in particular, his writings on the concept of race and the development of the human races. I argue that by doing so, we can shed much light on Kant's infamous claim that there is a radical evil in the human species. More precisely, we will come to appreciate that this evil is not, as it is usually understood, a static property or fixed characteristic of human beings. Instead, radical evil concerns a dynamic, changing defect in human nature that increasingly threatens our aspirations to collective moral perfection. (shrink)

The goal of the following paper is to consider the development and viability of Korsgaard’s latest work, Self-Constitution. More specifically, I show that we should understand this book as a response to difficulties with both Korsgaard’s argument in 1996’s The Sources of Normativity and Korsgaard’s earlier attempts to explain what marks the difference between realist and constructivist approaches to ethical theory. I begin by focusing primarily on her essay “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.” Here I consider exactly how (...) Korsgaard defines constructivism and what makes constructivism different from realist approaches to ethics. I then examine Korsgaard’s two most influential books – Sources and Self-Constitution – in light of this definition. Looking at Sources I argue that there is a serious problem with Korsgaard’s attempt to develop a constructivist moral theory; more specifically, I expose a tension in Korsgaard’s claim that ethical concepts both are rooted in a philosophy of action and exist only as the solution to a concrete practical problem. I then turn to Self-Constitution. I show that a different account of the distinction between realism and constructivism is proposed, one that not only seems designed to avoid the problems that plagued Sources but also forces Korsgaard to significantly revise and retreat from earlier attempt to distinguish constructivism from realism. Finally, I argue that obstacles remain for even this more moderate account. -/- . (shrink)

Kant’s account of moral feeling is continually disputed in the secondary literature. My goal is to focus on the Religion and make sense of moral feeling as it appears in this context. I argue that we can best understand moral feeling if we note its place in Kant’s concerns about the possibility of moral conversion. As Kant notes, if the new, morally upright man is of a different character than the man he used to be, then it remains unclear how (...) the new man can properly bear the debts of his old self. To address this issue, we need the presupposition that a person is both continually conscious of her empirical, bodily identity and capable of experiencing a felt recognition of the moral law; without this presupposition, I argue that fair punishment and the just payment of evil debts is impossible. (shrink)

Two generalizations can be made regarding Kant’s account of imperatives of skill and prudence. First, Groundwork 4:412-420 remains the locus classicus for reconstructions of Kant’s view. Second, it is widely agreed that Kant’s treatment of these imperatives is confusing, incomplete, and lacking the requisite argumentation. I agree that Groundwork 4:412-420 lacks a clear and defensible account of imperatives of skill and prudence. But while many think this spells trouble for Kant’s theory of non-moral practical imperatives more generally, and that Kant (...) never really clarified his position, on this point I differ. Groundwork II is problematic, yet it’s not Kant’s final word on the non-moral imperatives of practical reason. In fact, there is substantial and broadly overlooked evidence that Kant later rejected much of the account he laid out in this text. This evidence is found primarily in the third Critique, and I explore this evidence and the virtues of Kant’s revised account. (shrink)

Kant’s moral proof of the postulate of immortality in the Critique of Practical Reason is often dismissed as a failed argument that trades on illicit conceptual shifts. I argue that Kant’s argument is more interesting and less problematic than is usually thought. I first examine its role in the second Critique’s Dialectic. I then point out that the standard interpretation, according to which the argument presupposes God’s intuitive grasp of the moral equivalence between the disposition to pursue holiness and its (...) attainment, faces a number of philosophical and textual problems. I offer an alternative reading that avoids these problems. In particular, I stress the importance of Kant’s mathematized conception of the relationship between infinite progress towards an ideal goal and its attainment and argue that appealing to this conception allows Kant to meet a well-known criticism that his proof illegitimately substitutes the endless progress towards holiness for holiness itself. (shrink)

Many Kantians dismiss Kant’s claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good – an ideal world that combines complete virtue with complete happiness – as incompatible with the core of his moral philosophy. This dismissal, I argue, raises doubts about Kant’s ability to justify the moral law, yet it is a mistake. A duty to promote the highest good plays an important role in the justificatory strategy of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, its analysis leads to (...) a new perspective on Kant’s conception of moral objectivity. (shrink)

Critics of Kant’s moral philosophy often object that his emphasis on individual autonomy makes him unable to account for our ‘second-personal’ or ‘bipolar’ duties. These are duties we owetoother people rather than duties we havewith respect tothem – as we might have dutieswith respect tothe environment or works of art. With a recent and novel formulation of this objection as my foil, I argue that the apparent force of the ‘bipolarity’ objections rests on a failure to appreciate Kant’s inherently practical (...) approach to ethics. On the positive side, reflection on criticisms of Kant’s treatment of ‘bipolar’ normativity helps to shed new light on his conception of practical agency and its place in his system of morals. (shrink)

The article touches upon the problem of concept “Indian tradition of rationality”. The author recalls a genetic link of the concept with Western philosophy. She notices the complexity of its application to Indian material, gives some examples in which the use of Western concepts of “reason”, “methods of cognition”, etc., leads to a distortion of the text’s meaning, and when an application of the criteria of Western logic to analysis of Indian philosophical discourse gives the readers an impression of its (...) absurdity. However, according to the author’s mind, the difficulties with the applying of Western concepts are not the sufficient grounds to abandon them. This conclusion follows from the presence of comparative studies by researchers belonging to both traditions (for example, B.K. Matilal, J. Mohanty, A. Chakrabarti, etc.), who compare successfully Western and Indian kinds of logico-epistemological type of rationality. The difficulties just bring up the questions about new instrumental concepts and methods of comparative studies more adequate to Indian culture. There are two possible directions for the studies of Indian tradition of rationality in connection with the revision of contents of the concepts in Western post- modern philosophy. In the first of them the concept of rationality can not to be used at all, then the phenomenology of practices of Indian discourse becomes the subject of research, i.e. the discourse images in different contexts (religious, philosophical, scientific), its explicit and implicit foundations and aims, which aren’t coincide with Western ones. In the second case Indian rationality can be analyzed in accordance with the criteria of transversal reason and transversal rationality. (shrink)

Laura Papish’s Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform is an ambitious attempt to breath new life into old debates and a welcome contribution to a recent renaissance of interest in Kant’s theory of evil. ​The book has eight chapters, and these chapters fall into three main divisions. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the psychology of nonmoral and immoral action. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on self-deception, evil, and dissimulation. And chapters 6, 7, and 8 focus on (...) self-cognition, moral reform, and moral progress. I shall begin with a brief summary of these chapters. Then I shall turn to commentary. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ is widely regarded as one of the most influential works in the history of moral philosophy. Indeed, any student of ethics will soon encounter a translation of the book, although trying to read it is likely to cause bewilderment. What, one may ask, is Kant trying to say? This book provides the answers. Here, seven highly regarded teachers and scholars of Kant's ethics offer remarkably clear explanations of the most important concepts in (...) the _Groundwork_: the good will, happiness, duty, hypothetical and categorical imperatives, the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity, and freedom._ Contents:_ Preface _The Good Will_, Nataliya Palatnik _Happiness_, Anne Margaret Baxley _Duty_, Laura Papish _Imperatives_, Tamar Schapiro _The Formula of Universal Law_, Kyla Ebels-Duggan _The Formula of Humanity_, Japa Pallikkathayil _Freedom_, Lucy Allais About the Contributors Index. (shrink)

v. 1. Sŏngnihak pʻyŏn -- v. 2. Kyŏngse sasang pʻyŏn.

Throughout his writings, and particularly in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant alludes to the idea that evil is connected to self-deceit, and while numerous commentators regard this as a highly attractive thesis, none have seriously explored it. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform addresses this crucial element of Kant's ethical theory. -/- Working with both Kant's core texts on ethics and materials less often cited within scholarship on Kant's practical philosophy (such as Kant's logic lectures), (...) class='Hi'>Papish explores the cognitive dimensions of Kant's accounts of evil and moral reform while engaging the most influential -- and often scathing -- of Kant's critics. Her book asks what self-deception is for Kant, why and how it is connected to evil, and how we achieve the self-knowledge that should take the place of self-deceit. (shrink)

Many different writers have employed what might be termed the ‘existence criterion’ when offering realist analyses of perception. In all these realist accounts, a basic argument may be detected. If any experience—e.g. the having of either a sensory or a mental image—is to be a form of perceiving, then the statement reporting that experience must satisfy a condition which applies to all perceiving-statements. Any putative perceptual statement of the form ‘S perceives x’ must entail a statement to the effect that (...) x, or some y, does exist as a public perceptual object in S’s perceptual range. For example, my statement ‘I see Peter’ will be a proper perceptual statement only if Peter is a public perceptual object now in my line of vision, or only if I take some other public perceptual object now in my line of vision to be Peter. Statements about our having images of things, this basic argument continues, cannot satisfy this condition. The object imaged —e.g. Peter—is not always present in the subject’s perceptual range at the time of the imaging, and the subject does not necessarily take a public perceptual object in his perceptual range to be that object. Hence, any statement reporting our imaging something must be false if it is construed as a report of a perceiving. (shrink)

Urielʹ Dakosta.--Filosofskai︠a︡ sistema Spinozy.--Sot︠s︡ialʹnai︠a︡ ėtika Mabli i Morelli.--Zhak Nėzhon i ego ateizm.--K voprosu o politicheskikh vzgli︠a︡dakh Zh.-B. Robinė.--"Sot︠s︡ialʹnai︠a︡ sistema" Golʹbakha i ee russkiĭ perevodchik XVIII v.--Tragedii︠a︡ russkogo materializma XVIII v. (filosofskie vzgli︠a︡dy A. N. Radishcheva).--I. P. Pnin i ego mesto v istorii russkoĭ obshchestvennoĭ mysli.--Filosofskie vzgli︠a︡dy dekabrista I︠A︡kushkina.